The emergence of cashless stores has led several cities and states to ban such stores. This article investigates this issue by characterizing consumers who pay cash for in-person purchases and consumers who do not have credit or debit cards. Using a random utility model, I estimate 1.3 to 30.9 percentage drop in average per-payment consumer surplus if all stores were to become cashless and when utility is measured by the cost of making a payment, security, and convenience. The conclusion provides a discussion of alternatives to cash for in-person purchases that may be needed before all brickand-mortar stores become cashless.
Introduction
Imagine entering a store, picking up a few items, and then existing the store without going through a checkout counter. No, this isn't necessarily a theft, as a chip embedded under the buyer's arm or in her mobile device is scanned on the way out and a cashless payment is made. This sounds very efficient, however, digging into the question how consumers fund these payments reveals that not all consumers can benefit from such payment systems. This is because not all consumers have credit cards, debit cards, or even bank accounts that that are needed for funding cashless payments.
On the regulatory side, the emergence of cashless stores has led several cities and states to ban such stores. Starting July, 2019, Philadelphia's new law will require most retail stores to accept cash. San Francisco passed a similar law in May 2019. Cashless businesses are already banned in Massachusetts and more recently in New Jersey. 1 This study focuses on the consumer side of this policy debate by investigating how consumers with and without credit and debit cards pay for their in-person purchases. Therefore, the effects of shifting to cashless stores on merchants and total welfare are not evaluated in this study. This is because different merchants have different preferences over payment instruments, and these preferences are hard to estimate because they tend to be merchant specific. For example, small merchants in high-crime area would benefit from abandoning cash. Merchants with low profit margins may prefer cash to avoid paying high fees for processing credit cards transactions and to shorten their wait time between the sale and when the funds are credited to their bank account. 2 It is important to emphasize that this paper is not about phasing out cash (often referred to as "cashless society"). The limited goal is to investigate how a transition to cashless stores would affect consumers in general and consumers who do not have credit or debit cards in particular. This paper also abstracts from the debate on whether large denomination notes should be eliminated 1 See, https://www.wsj.com/articles/philadelphia-is-first-u-s-city-to-ban-cashless-stores-11551967201, http://fortune.com/2019/04/03/cashless-stores-retail-amazon-go/, and https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/ 05/08/heres-why-a-cashless-society-is-not-coming-to-san-francisco/. 2 Schmiedel, Kostova, and Ruttenberg (2012) analyze merchants' costs of accepting payment instruments in European countries and Kosse et al. (2017) in Canada. Some early cost estimates of transitioning to cashless transactions are given in Garcia-Swartz, Hahn, and Layne-Farrar (2006a,b) . 1 in order to reduce crime, tax evasion, or to allow for negative interest rates, see Rogoff (2016) and counter arguments in McAndrews (2017) .
The goal of this research is to identify and characterize consumers who would be affected the most by transitioning to cashless stores, and to empirically estimate the burden that may be imposed on these consumers. Eliminating cash from in-person purchases would have mixed welfare consequences depending on the type of consumer. More precisely, consumers who pay cash but already have non-cash means of payments, such as credit and debit cards, may find it easy to switch to non-cash payments. In contrast, consumers who do not have credit or debit cards would be forced to purchase prepaid cards unless some other non-cash means of payments become available without having to open an account in a commercial bank. In fact, recently several large sports stadiums began experimenting with cashless concession stands and ticket offices. For fans that do not carry credit or debit cards, the stadium provides reverse ATMs where consumers insert cash and get back a prepaid card. 3 A complete transition to cashless stores would be extremely difficult in any country (if not impossible) particularly because the use of cash at the point-of-sale remains strong in most countries. Krüger and Seitz (2014) , Fung, Huynh, and Stuber (2015) , Arango, Huynh, and Sabetti (2015) , David, Abel, and Patrick (2016) , and Wakamori and Welte (2017) explore the intensity of cash use, and how cash dominates low value transactions. Studies by Bagnall et al. (2016 ), Bech et al. (2018 , and Khiaonarong and Humphrey (2019) provide international comparisons of the intensity of cash use.
The findings on the intensity of cash use in the above literature is consistent with the data described in Section 2. Figure 1 shows how respondents' use of the five main payment instruments for in-person purchases vary with the payment amount. The top panel shows that about 70 percent of all payments not exceeding $5 were made with cash. This ratio drops to about 50 percent for payment amounts between $5 and $10. Uneven spacing on the x-axis reflects the relative number of payments in the relevant dollar amount range. Perhaps the most striking empirical result, shown on the bottom panel in Figure 1 , is that the average share of cash payments (again by 3 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/03/arthur-blanks-next-stadium-revolution-going-cashless.html. 2 volume of in-person purchases) is above 8 percent for payment amounts between $100 and $400.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 characterizes consumers who do not have credit or debit cards. Section 4 characterizes in-person purchases and cash users. Section 5 constructs a random utility model to estimate the effects of cashless stores on consumer welfare. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of alternatives to cash for in-person purchases that may be needed before all brick-and-mortar stores become cashless.
Data, variable selection, and coding
The study of consumer payment choice at the point-of-sale (POS) involves a classification of payment methods such as cash, paper checks, credit cards, debit cards, and prepaid cards. Data on "how consumers pay" are collected by consumer surveys in which consumers list all the payment instruments they have (adopt) and whether and how they use them at the POS. In particular, diary surveys record, either in real time or by the end of each day, all consumers' payment-related activities including dollar amount, spending type, merchant type, and payment method as well as money transfers in general and ATM cash withdrawals in particular.
The data and the R-code used in this analysis are available for downloading from the author's Webpage: www.ozshy.com (click on "Recent articles"). The data are taken from the 2017 and 2018 Survey and Diary of Consumer Payment Choice (SCPC and DCPC). 4 Both, the SCPC and the DCPC are representative samples of U.S. consumers. The DCPC records transactions during three consecutive days. Transactions include purchases, bill payments, ATM withdrawals and deposits.
Respondents' three day diaries were evenly distributed throughout the months of October 2017 and October 2018 in a way that resembles a three-period overlapping generations model. 5
Both, the SCPC and the DCPC have a large number of variables describing all sorts of demographics and transactions. For the purpose of this article, I will focus only on a subset of variables, 4 The survey and the diary are conducted in collaboration of the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta, Boston, Richmond, and San Francisco (Cash Product Office). The data and assisting documents (codebooks) are publicly available for downloading from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Website: https://www.frbatlanta.org/ banking-and-payments/consumer-payments.aspx, and are summarized in Greene and Stavins (2018b) and Kumar and O'Brien (2019) . Similar surveys are conducted by the Bank of Canada, see Henry, Huynh, and Welte (2018) . 5 Jonker and Kosse (2009) compare payment diaries with different time lengths and find that shorter diaries yield more accurate information due to "survey fatigue" which leads respondents to under report their payment activities.
3 some of which I describe below. From the SCPC, I use five cost assessment variables "as003a2-e2" and three binary variables "cc adopt", "dc adopt", and "svc adopt" indicating whether the respondent has a credit card, debit card, and prepaid (store-value) card, respectively, see Table 1 .
Respondents who participated in both, the SCPC and the DCPC are matched via "prim key" (2017) and "uasid" (2018) which are unique ID numbers of survey respondents.
Most of the variables are taken from the DCPC which records actual transactions. In particular, I restrict the analysis to 16,949 "in-person" (in-person = 1) expenditure ("type" = 1) payments made by 2889 unique respondents; and then further restrict to 13,647 payments made by 2688 respondents in six merchant categories (merch = 1 to 6) using the five major payment methods (pi = 1 to 5): "cash," "check," "credit card," "debit card," and "prepaid card," see Table 2 . 6 After removing a few respondents who did not report on their card adoption profile, the sample was reduced to 12,277 in-person payment observations made by 2304 respondents. Other variables used include "amnt" (dollar amount of each payment), "age," "income hh" (household income), "hh size" (number of persons in the household), "work," "gender," and "education."
Finally, a note about the use of sampling weights. The data contain weights for all respondents that can be used to match the data with the adult U.S. population (18 and older). I indicate when the reported statistics are computed with weights either by (weighted) or (w) inside tables. In general, statistics on small subsamples or subgroups are reported without weights, because these subsamples may be correlated with some demographic variables upon which the weights are computed. 7 6 The merchant categories are: 1. Grocery stores, convenience stores without gas stations, pharmacies, 2. gas stations, 3. sit-down restaurants and bars, 4. fast food restaurants, coffee shops, cafeterias, food trucks, 5. general merchandise stores, department stores, other stores, and 6. general services: hair dressers, auto repair, parking lots, laundry or dry cleaning, etc.
7 Table 2 provides a good example where weighting can potentially reduce accuracy. A comparison between the percentage of payments % and the corresponding weighted value % (w) shows that the difference between the two is larger when the sample size is restricted with respect to respondents' card adoption profile. For example, the column on the right (prepaid) shows that the difference is 2.4 minus 2.2 for the All sample, and increases to 12.1 minus 13.3 for respondents who do not have credit or debit cards. Note that card adoption is correlated with household income which is a component in the construction of sampling weights.
Who doesn't have a card?
This section uses the data described in Section 2 to identify the payment instruments that were available to respondents who made in-person purchases from six merchant categories. These consumers are then grouped into card adoption (and nonadoption) profiles. Appendix A goes deeper into this grouping by regressing consumers' card adoption profiles on consumers' demographic variables. The classification of consumers according to their card adoption profiles serves as a preparation for Section 4 which investigates how the intensity of cash payments is influenced by consumers' card adoption profiles. Table 1 is divided into columns according to respondents' possession (adoption) of credit and debit cards. The column on the right shows that 3.8 percent of the respondents (4.8 weighted)
reported not having any credit or debit card. 67.4 percent (66.1 weighted) have both cards, 17.6 percent (19.8 weighted) do not have credit cards (but may or may not have debit cards), and 18.4 percent (18.9 weighted) do not have debit cards (but may or may not have credit cards). It must be emphasized that the card adoption profiles displayed in Table 1 apply only to the 2304 respondents who, during their diary days, made in-person purchases from the merchant types described in Footnote 6. For card adoption profiles in the general population see Figure 2 in Greene and Stavins (2018a) . Table 1 shows that card adoption is related to household income in the following way: The median household income of respondents who have both credit and debit cards is $67,500 and drops to $19,500 for respondents who do not have any credit or debit card. 8 The weighted average of household income is $89,766 (with both cards) and drops to $38,787 (with no cards). Figure 2 displays respondents' card adoption profiles with respect to their yearly household income not exceeding $120,000. Uneven spacing on the x-axis reflects the relative number of respondents in the relevant income category. This figure shows that higher household income is correlated with credit card adoption in the sense that nonadoption rates decline with household income. The increase in credit card adoption with respect to household income is expected given that credit card issuers in the United States base their credit card approval (as well as credit line) on cardholders' household income. Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that nonadoption of either card remains above 2 or 3 percent even at higher household income levels up to $70,000, which is higher than the median 2017 U.S. family income $61,372. In fact, regrouping all income categories below the 2017 median income level shows that the average cards' nonadoption rate was 6.7 percent.
This means that 6.7 percent of respondents with household income below the median level could not pay with debit or credit cards for their in-person purchases.
The use of cash for in-person purchases
Section 3 and Appendix A characterized and grouped consumers according to the type of payment instruments available to them. In order to better understand the impact of a policy of allowing or banning cashless stores on consumers, this section analyzes the use of cash for in-person purchases for each consumer group. Subsection 4.1 examines cash transactions within each consumer group. Subsection 4.2 analyzes the distribution of individual respondents' percentage use of cash. The bottom four rows in Table 2 show how respondents with no credit or debit cards allocate their purchase payments between cash and prepaid cards, which are the only practical means of payment available to them. 9 For these respondents, 86.9 percent of the payments were made with cash and 12.1 percent were made with prepaid cards.
Card adoption and the use of cash

Percentage use of cash by individual respondents
The percentage use of cash displayed in Table 1 , Table 2 , and Figure 2 were constructed based on payments made by respondents with different card adoption profiles. More precisely, transactions of respondents with the same card adoption profile were grouped together. This section digs deeper into consumer payment choice by analyzing the distribution of respondents' percentage use of cash. (25 th percentile) which happens to be zero for that group. This implies that at least a quarter of respondents who carry both credit and debit cards did not use cash for in-person purchases. The upper edge of this box marks the upper quartile (75 th percentile) which is 55.1 percent. That is, three-quarters of these respondents used cash for less than 55.1 percent of their transactions.
In contrast to respondents who carry both cards, the box plot on the right in Figure 3 shows that all respondents who do not have any credit or debit card pay cash, with the exception of a few outliers marked by the small circles. These outliers correspond to the few paper check and prepaid card payments made by respondents in that group, see the bottom four rows in Table 2 The 'notches' displayed on sides of each box plot correspond to the 95-percent confidence intervals around the median percentage cash use. Therefore, a comparison of any pair of box plots in which notches do not overlap implies that there is strong evidence (with 95 percent confidence) that the corresponding two medians are unequal. Figure 3 reveals statistically significant differences in the medians of cash percentage use among respondents with different card adoption profiles, except for some overlap between respondents who do not have credit cards (third box plot) and respondents who do not have debit cards (fourth box plot). The third and fourth box plots show that half of the respondents who do not have credit cards and half of the respondents who do not have debit cards used cash to pay for 60 percent and two-thirds of their in-person purchases, respectively.
Implications for consumer welfare: A random utility model
This section constructs a random utility model to estimate the effects on consumer welfare of a hypothetical complete transition to cashless stores. It should be emphasized that the terms consumer welfare, utility, and consumer surplus refer to the net gain (benefit minus cost) consumers derive from the paying using a particular payment instrument. Here, the use of these three terms is substantially different from the widespread use of these terms to measure the benefits derived from consuming a product or service that consumers purchase.
It should also be emphasized that the welfare estimations are based on existing payment instruments: cash, checks, debit cards, credit cards, and prepaid cards. These estimations do not take into account that a transition to cashless stores may be supported by an emergence of new payment instruments which are discussed in the conclusion of this article.
Measuring payment cost and benefit
Discrete choice estimations of utility consumers derive from a given a set of alternatives rely on known prices that consumers pay for choosing each alternative. For example, random utility models of commuters' choice among transportation modes (bus, car, subway, train, or air) are based ticket prices (fares) that passengers pay for using each transportation mode.
In contrast, researchers who study consumer payment choice are unable to figure out the exact price or cost of paying with each payment instrument. There are two reasons for that: First, it is very hard to separate variable from fixed costs associated with adopting and using a particular payment instrument. For example, the cost of paying cash is heavily affected by ATM fees and their nearest location. Similarly, the cost of paying with prepaid cards depends heavily on the cost of reloading funds onto cards. Second, some costs of payment instruments vary among consumers. In other words, the cost of using a particular payment method tends to be consumer specific. Consumer cost of paying with credit cards depends on whether the consumer is a borrower or a convenience user (who may also earn cash back). The cost of using debit cards depends on checking account maintenance fees charged by the issuing bank. 10 For this reason, this paper takes a novel approach by using respondent-specific assessments of each payment instrument to identify consumer-specific cost and benefit derived from using each payment instrument. Figure 4 provides summary statistics of how consumers assess the cost of each payment instrument. It shows that consumers (with all card adoption profiles) view cash as the least costly payment instrument and credit cards as the most costly payment instrument.
Consumers who have debit cards view them as the second least costly payment method.
The other two attributes used in this analysis are security and convenience assessments. The acceptance assessment is not included in the regressions because it was found to be not statistically significant. Note that respondents' assessments are ratings (as opposed to rankings) so each assessment can take any number between 1 to 5 independently of the assessment numbers assigned to other payment instruments.
The advantage of using cost, security, and convenience assessments as explanatory variables for consumers' utility of using each payment instrument is that the data provide assessments by each individual separately. Therefore, the change in consumer surplus is computed from the perspective of each consumer (actually each transaction) separately. The data show that assessments tend to differ among respondents and also that the choice of payment instrument is indeed in-fluenced by these assessments. More precisely, 56.9 percent view the payment method that they actually used as the least costly and 20.5 percent as the second least costly. 64.9 percent paid with the instrument they rate as highest on convenience and 25.6 percent as the second highest. Finally, 21 percent view the payment instrument they actually used as the most secure, and 31 percent as the second most secure.
Estimating the burden on cash users using a random utility model
Each respondent recorded several payments for in-person purchases made during the assigned diary days. Most respondents used more than one payment instrument to pay for their purchases.
For this reason, this section computes the consumer surplus for each transaction separately as if each payment were made by a different individual. Payments made by the same individual will use the same cost, security, and convenience assessments made by the respondent who reported the payment.
Consumers initially choose among 5 payment instruments i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, where 1 denotes cash, 2 denotes check, 3 denotes credit card, 4 denotes debit card, and 5 denotes prepaid card.
In a random utility model, the utility derived by respondent n from paying with payment instrument i for transaction t is defined by
V n,i = β C cost n,i + β S security n,i + β E convenience n,i .
n,i,t is the random component of the utility (1) which is assumed to be distributed Type I Extreme Value.
Columns 4, 6, and 8 in Table 3 display the values of the estimated coefficients β C , β S , and β E . The coefficient were estimated using multinomial logit without the constant term and also by treating each transaction t as a separate observation. 11 Payment observations by the same individual n were assigned the same cost, security, and convenience assessments of the particular 11 The estimation used the mlogit R-package which makes it possible to estimate a single vector of coefficients, instead of a separate set of coefficients for each of the 5 payment instruments (usually obtained from multinomial logit estimations). 10 respondent.
For this estimation, I removed all 224 check payment observations and also removed check (payment instrument 2) from the consumers' choice set. There are two reasons for that: First, check payments constituted only 1.7 percent of all payments made for in-person purchases. Second, check is unlikely to serve as a substitute for cash after stores become cashless. Credit, debit, and prepaid cards (for those who do not have other cards) are closer substitutes for cash than checks. Table 3 shows that utility of paying declines with the assessed cost of the payment instrument the respondent chooses to pay with, β C < 0. Conversely, β E > 0 which implies the utility increases with the convenience of the payment instrument. The estimated values of β S are small and are not always statistically significant, which imply that utility is less sensitive to the consumer's assessed security level relative to the other two attributes.
Substituting the estimated values of the three coefficients given in Table 3 into (2) yields consumer n's estimated utility consumer n derives from paying with instrument i. Then, following Train (2009) (chapter 3, page 56) , the rate of change in consumer n's surplus resulting from the hypothetical elimination of cash (payment instrument 1) as a payment choice can be computed by
where V n,i are computed by substituting the estimated coefficients into (2) relies on the assumption that the estimated utilities of payment instruments V n,i for i = 3, 4, 5 do not change after payment choice i = 1 is eliminated. This assumption implies that the assessments of cash attributes (cost, security, and convenience) are independent of the assessments of noncash payment instruments. This assumption is reasonable because respondents assessments are ratings (not rankings) so each assessment can take any number between 1 to 5 independently of the numbers assigned to other payment instruments. From a technical perspective, (3) relies on the Property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) in which adding or subtracting choice alternatives have no effects on the utility derived from other choice alternative.
Change in per-payment consumer surplus: Estimations results
Expression (3) provides the formula for computing the rate of change (drop) in consumer surplus resulting from a hypothetical complete transition to cashless stores. The columns labeled "Med"
and "Avg" in Table 3 display the median and average drop rate in the per-payment consumer surplus. That is, in averaging the per-payment drop rate in consumer surplus, the rate of change for respondents who made more payments were counted more times than of those who made fewer payments. There are two reasons for that: First, because some respondents paid with different instruments for different transactions, the regressions were run over all payment observations including multiple payments by the same respondents. Second, to derive policy implications, consumers who make more payments should have their consumer surplus counted proportionally more times when measuring the median and average of the rate of change in per-payment consumer surplus. Table 3 summarizes the results obtained from nine regressions. The first three rows summarize three regression results over all payment amounts for three subsamples: 9767 payments by respondents who have both credit and debit cards, 1278 payments by respondents with debit but no credit cards, and 326 payments by respondents who do not have credit or debit cards.
Comparing these three subsamples, the average expected drop in per-payment consumer surplus resulting from a complete transition to cashless stores is estimated to be 1.3 percent for consumers with both cards, 11.3 percent for consumers with debit but not credit card, and 30.9 percent for consumers with no debit or credit cards. Not surprisingly, these findings imply that consumers who have more options are less affected from the elimination of cash than consumers with less payment options.
The computations of drop rates in per-payment consumer surplus for the three groups of consumers were repeated for payments not exceeding $50 and again for payments not exceeding $20.
Results are displayed in Table 3 in rows 4 to 6 and rows 7 to 9, respectively. The striking result is that the drop rate somewhat declines for consumers with no cards (from 30.9 to 27.0 and then slightly up to 28.5 percent) when the sample is restricted to lower dollar amounts. In contrast, the drop rate in consumer surplus increases for consumers who have both cards (1.3 to 2.4, and to 9.4 percent) when the sample is restricted to lower dollar amounts. The reason for this difference is related to a previous finding from Table 2 in which consumers who have credit and debit cards tend to use cash mostly for low-value purchases. In contrast, consumers who do not have cards use cash to pay for most of their purchases. That is, Table 2 shows that the average cash payment of respondents with both cards is $14.13 whereas the average cash payments by respondents with no cards is $22.76. This explains why consumers with both cards suffer a larger drop in consumer surplus when the sample is restricted to lower dollar amounts (less than $50 or $20) compared with consumers who do not have cards.
Finally, comparing the "Med" with "Avg" columns and also "Min" with "Max" columns in Table 3 reveal large variations among drop rates of consumer surplus. This is expected given that for some transactions, respondents paid with the payment instrument that they did not assess to be the lowest cost or the most convenient. This noise corresponds to the random component of the utility function (1).
Conclusion: A discussion of cost and cash alternatives
This paper identifies the type of consumer who would be affected the most from a transition to cashless stores. The analysis proceeds with estimations of a random utility model in order to compute the expected burden on cash users from a hypothetical complete transition to cashless stores.
The model defines the utility of paying with each payment instrument as a linear function of three attributes of each instrument: cost, security, and convenience. These attributes are reported by survey respondents and are matched with the payment choices reported in their diaries. It should be emphasized that effects of these three attributes on payment choice have also been recorded in other surveys. For example, a survey by the Bank of Canada also found that "consumers still rate cash as an easy-to-use, low cost, secure, and widely accepted payment method," see Henry, Huynh, and Welte (2018) .
A complete analysis of a transition to cashless stores must also estimate its effect on merchants who pay fees for processing card payments. Hayashi and Minhas (2008) show that credit card interchange fees in the United States are significantly higher than in Europe and several other countries. Therefore, transitioning from cash payments to card payments would increase total fees paid by merchants to the card-issuing banks.
A comprehensive discussion of cashless stores should also consider some innovative options currently not available to U.S. consumers, such as:
(a) Rogoff (2016) (pp. 98-100) explores the possibility of introducing subsidized debit cards. These cards could also be issued with a mobile device option. A complete solution must also specify whether such a card will be linked to (and funded by) a commercial bank account or a government-provided (or behalf of the government) bank account, and whether these accounts maintain 100-percent reserves in order to eliminate any risk. Baradaran (2015) advocates reenlisting the U.S. Post Office in its historic function of providing bank services.
(b) Fung and Halaburda (2016) , BIS (2018) , and Khiaonarong and Humphrey (2019) analyze Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) intended to replace currency notes and coins for the general public that could also be issued directly to consumers.
Finally, unlike the U.S., some countries have managed to achieve some ubiquity in the use of non-cash payment instruments based on apps installed on mobile devices. Ubiquity relies on market dominance of one or two mobile money transmitters that charge low (near zero) fees to merchants who accept payments using these services. This seems to be the direction China is taking via the dominance of WeChat and Alipay, and in Kenya via M-Pesa. 12 This solution is still incomplete because it relies on having payers fund their payments via their local bank accounts, which implies that consumers with no bank accounts or tourists cannot benefit from these services.
The exception is M-Pesa which relies on local kiosks that convert cash to mobile money and vice versa without the use of bank accounts.
Appendix A Card adoption and consumer demographics
The regressions in this appendix estimate demographic effects on 2668 respondents' card adoption profiles. Each column in Table 4 lists the average marginal effects estimated from the following discrete choice logistic regression model:
In each regression (corresponding to each of the four adoption profiles), the dependent variable Comparing the column on the left side with the column on the right side in Table 4 reveals that household income is positively related to the adoption of both cards and negatively related to having no cards. These marginal effects are statistically significant although small due to the nonlinearity of this monotonic relationship as displayed in Figure 2 . Older age increases the probability that a respondent owns both types of card and decreases the probability that the respondent does not own debit and credit cards.
Looking at some categorical variables in Figure 4 : Respondents' cost assessment of adopting and using five payment instruments ranging from 1 (lowest cost) to 5 (highest cost). Note: Respondents are grouped according to their card adoption profile.
